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The United Nations General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) and the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights (1950) were 
contrasting responses to the ‘paradigm shift’ in social and political attitudes induced 
by the dysfunctional behaviour of the western world’s economic and financial 
systems, and the attendant social trauma, political extremism, war-mongering and 
racism of the preceding twenty years. At the core of this attitudinal shift were 
demands for counter-cyclical state spending to obviate the chronic unemployment of 
the 1930s; for a ‘welfare state’ in which there would be universal access to health 
services, education and social security; and for a ‘f ee society’ in which civil and 
political liberties would be guaranteed. These demands were crystallised between 
1939 and 1945 (1) by the manner in which unemployment was mopped up in 
Germany by Hitler’s rearmament programme and subsequently in Britain and the 
United States by government war-time expenditure; (2) by the widespread feelings of 
‘entitlement’ engendered by a conflict which cost 100 million lives and inflicted 
unparalleled hardship and physical devastation on civilians; and (3) by the radical 
social agendas proclaimed by the Atlantic Charter and Chapter IX of the United 
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Nations Charter (‘International and Social Co-operation’). After elaborating on the 
historical context which explains the unprecedented emphasis of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration on social and economic rights, this paper goes on to discuss why the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights, which established the European Court of 
Human Rights as a bastion of civil and political rights, completely ignored social and 
economic rights. 
                                                                         
Context of UDHR 
 
Professor Johannes Morsink, the author of The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1999), attributes the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948 principally to the human 
atrocities committed during the war of 1939-1945, above all the Holocaust.  Morsink 
may have been influenced by the Assembly’s unanimous adoption on the preceding 
day of a Convention obliging its signatories to prevent and punish acts of genocide. 
Yet the Universal Declaration, as its title implied, embraced a comprehensive 
spectrum of human rights which were to be registered, fostered and protected. This 
predictably included the so-called ‘first generation’ f ‘negative’ individual, civil and 
political rights (‘freedom from’ physical abuse, arbitrary legal procedures, 
persecution, discrimination, thought control, political oppression), which had been 
articulated during the seventeenth and eighteenth century revolutionary struggles of 
Britain, France and the American colonies, only to be trampled underfoot by the 
dictatorial regimes of inter-war Europe. Yet unprecedented prominence was also 
given to the ‘second generation’ of ‘positive’ (‘ rights to’ social, economic and 
cultural justice) which had been forged in response to the vagaries of nineteenth and 
twentieth century capitalist development. This emphasis on ‘second generation’ rights 
was reinforced by the conviction that the booms and slumps of the western economic 
and financial system between the wars had been an underlying cause of the 
authoritarian, aggressive and racist behaviour of countries such as Germany. The 
latter’s newly founded Weimar Republic had set out in 1919 to become a state-of-the-
art liberal democracy, but had been temporarily crippled by the hyperinflation of 
1923-1924 and finally succumbed to the Nazi dictatorship largely because of the 
massive unemployment induced in the early 1930s by the pre-Keynesian deflationary 
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policies of the right-centre cabinet of Heinrich Brüning. It should be stressed that 
Hitler knew nothing about economics and came to power not because he had a 
programme to relieve unemployment but because the traditional conservative elite 
with whom he formed a coalition government in January 1933 regarded him as a heat 
shield against the Communists and Social Democrats, who had garnered more seats 
than the Nazis in the Reichstag elections of November 1932 in response to the 
depression. 
 
It was his awareness of the deviant trajectory of Germany and other Axis powers 
which prompted H.V. Evatt, Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, to remind the  
conference which gathered at San Francisco in 1945 to devise the United Nations 
collective security system, that there were socio-enomic preconditions for the 
preservation of international peace. ‘The great threat to human freedom which we 
have been combating for five years’, he declared, ‘arose out of, and was made 
possible by, an environment dominated by unemployment and lacking freedom from 
want.’ As Professor Glendon, the author of A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001) 
remarks, ‘the widespread support for the Australian position led to strengthening the 
Charter’s provision for an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), making it the 
principal organ of the UN, alongside the Security Council’. The Human Rights 
Commission, one of the first bodies established by ECOSOC in 1946, duly drafted a 
Universal Declaration, Articles 22-28 of which plotted the path to international social 
justice via the right to work and protection against unemployment; the right to equal 
pay for equal work; the right to remuneration consistent with human dignity, well-
being, health and development; the right to join trade unions; the right to leisure and 
periodic paid holidays; the right of mothers and children to social protection; the right 
to free, compulsory primary education and access on gr unds of merit to secondary 
and tertiary study; and, finally, the right to participate freely in the cultural life of the 
community and even to IP protection. 
 
The crusade for socio-economic justice was given additional impetus by the 
realisation of the Anglo-American financial elite tha  the seemingly chronic 
unemployment which afflicted Britain and the United States in the 1930s had been 
mopped up almost overnight by government expenditure on the war effort. (In the 
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1930s, unemployment had never dropped below 10% in Britain and, after peaking at 
23% in 1932, had hovered at between 12% and 18% in the United States until 1940). 
Such changes acted to reaffirm the growing influence of Keynesian ‘demand-side’ 
economic theory and its increased prominence amongst many influential thinkers, 
notably Sir William Beveridge, the Master of University College, Oxford. No longer 
was there an insurmountable domestic financial obstacle to the achievement of a 
‘welfare state’ based on full, or close-to-full, employment, and buttressed by 
increased government outlays on social security, healt , housing and education. The 
notion that ‘Full Employment in a Free Society’, as Beveridge was to label it, was 
attainable quickly struck a chord with the ‘bleeding masses’. Indeed, given the 
unheard of physical exposure to the conflict as a result of ‘tactical’ terror bombing, 
Britain in particular, felt such experiences ‘entitled’ it to ‘a decent minimum standard 
of living for all’ as compensation for the suffering endured. It was highly significant 
that 635,000 copies of the Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services 
were sold after it was reluctantly released to the public by the martially focussed 
Churchill government on 29 November 1942. The BBC’s initiative of broadcasting 
details of the Report in twenty-two languages ensured that the ideas of Beveridge 
would also permeate the programs of the European resistance movements which 
gained increasing momentum in the wake of the German defeat at Stalingrad in 
January 1943. 
 
The legitimacy of government intervention in the cause of social justice was boosted 
even in the free market United States. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation was to 
mitigate the impact of the depression via the 1935 National Labour Relations 
(Wagner) Act (guaranteeing the right of workers to form trade unions and strike) and 
the accompanying Social Security Act, which provided for unemployment insurance 
and benefits for retired, disabled and bereaved spouses. By the time of the Atlantic 
Charter, which he proclaimed with Churchill in August 1941, Roosevelt had 
committed himself not only to helping to destroy Nazi tyranny but also to achieving 
what amounted to an international New Deal by means of ‘collaboration between all 
nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour 
standards, economic advancement and social security’ by means which included 
‘access, on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world which are needed 
for their economic prosperity’. Roosevelt was rash enough, inadvisedly as it 
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transpired, to underpin this radical international agenda at the domestic level with his 
1944 State of the Union Address proposal for a ‘Second (Socio-Economic) Bill of 
Rights’, which promised good education, useful and remunerative employment, 
adequate wages, medical care, social security and housing for all Americans. 
 
The Context of the European Convention of 1950 
 
Why, in view of the widespread acceptance of the notio  of increased state 
intervention to ensure greater social justice and thereby to protect the peace of the 
world, did the European Convention of 1950 omit any reference to socio-economic 
rights? It is too simple to attribute this silence to the narrow focus of the 
predominantly English lawyers who drafted this instrument upon ‘first generation’ 
rights which were ‘justiciable’ before the European Court of Human Rights which the 
Convention established. A more sophisticated explanatio  is suggested by the title of 
A.W.B. Simpson’s labyrinthine 1,161 page monograph Human Rights and the End of 
Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford: OUP, 2001) In 
brief, it can be inferred from the evidence unearthed by Simpson that the British 
Foreign Office had only been prepared to sign the Universal Declaration because it 
was not a Convention, which would have been binding o  the signatories. The main 
reason for British reservations is to be found in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration, 
which makes it clear that the ‘universality’ of the document resided not simply in its 
comprehensiveness but also in its applicability to ‘all sorts and conditions’ of human 
beings. Article 2 reads 
 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, 
no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international 
status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 
 
In would seem that it was the threat posed by the Universal Declaration to the British 
Empire, the preservation of which was one of the pillars of British policy, which 
prompted the Foreign Office to relocate its activity in the international human rights 
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arena from the UN to the Council of Europe. The Council was a smaller and more 
manageable regional organisation that initially represented ten advanced western 
European, Scandinavian and Benelux countries which ad been established early in 
1949. In view of Britain’s reluctance to become involved in any genuine, as opposed 
to gestural, moves towards European integration at this juncture, it seems likely that 
the Foreign Office valued the Council of Europe, which was largely a British creation, 
primarily as a platform from which to promulgate a restricted ‘first generation’ 
version of Human Rights. Such a conclusion is encouraged by the Preamble of the 
European Convention, which, after genuflecting to the Universal Declaration, stressed 
the appropriateness of the governments of European cou tries ‘which are like-minded 
and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law 
…(taking) the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights (my 
italics) stated in the Universal Declaration’. 
 
Apart from the onset of the Cold War (which led to the informal exclusion of 
Communist powers from the deliberations of the Council of Europe), the 
overwhelming reason for the sidelining of social, economic and cultural rights in the 
late 1940s was the snow-balling anti-New Deal backlash in the United States after 
Roosevelt’s death and the end of hostilities. This development was a predictable 
response to the unprecedented rise in federal expenditure from roughly 10 per cent of 
GNP in 1939 to 45 percent of a much larger GNP in 1945. The fiscal hackles of the 
Republican opposition were raised particularly by the Lend-Lease programme which 
financed a virtual gift of strategic supplies worth $26 billion to Britain and $11 billion 
to the Soviet Union during the war. These immense expenditures, coupled with 
rumours that American supplies had been misused, and the objection of New Deal 
critics to government handouts of any description, meant that, although the Lend-
Lease Act was extended in 1944 and 1945, the debates grew louder and the majorities 
smaller. Further straws in the wind were the summary rejection by Congress of an 
attempt by Truman to implement Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights in September 
1945; the emasculation of his Full Employment Bill, retitled Employment Bill, and 
redrafted largely by the U.S. Chamber of Congress; the abolition of the controls 
which had proliferated during the war under the aegis of the much-hated Office of 
Price Administration (OPA); and finally the landslide victory of the Republicans in 
the ‘beefsteak’ congressional election of November 1946. After the first meeting of 
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the triumphant House and Senate Republicans who descended on Washington in mid 
November 1946 leading journalists such as the Alsop br thers remarked that Senator 
Taft, an inflexible advocate of retrenchment and tax cuts, was beginning to look like a 
progressive compared with his colleagues. Since it was said of Taft that ‘whenever he 
heard the words ‘international cooperation ‘, ‘he reached for an amendment’, the 
future of American financial multilateralism, upon which the achievement of the 
socio-economic rights foreshadowed in the Atlantic Charter and Universal 
Declaration was jeopardised. 
 
It was ironical that in the midst of this upsurge of fiscal conservatism in Washington a 
Preparatory Committee appointed by ECOSOC in response to Anglo-American 
Proposals for an International Conference on Trade and Employment met in London 
to discuss the drafting of a Charter which would provide the international financial 
underpinning for the achievement of adequate social and economic rights throughout 
the world. The so-called Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation 
(ITO) was eventually signed by over fifty nations who deliberated in Cuba between 
November 1947 and March 1948. The conviction of the signatories was that full 
employment could be achieved and maintained only if international trade were 
regulated to pre-empt ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies and, more positively, to 
promote balanced development by means of ‘fair trade’. These objectives could best 
be pursued in general by fostering industrial and other development with international 
capital flows; providing equal access to markets and productive facilities; reducing 
tariffs and other discriminatory measures; and eliminating restrictive business 
practices. In many ways the aims and objectives of the ITO resembled those of the 
World Trade Organisation which was established half a century later. But the 
organisational structures of the two were different, the former being a ‘Charter’ 
organisation which mandated collective action as opposed to the power-based 
bargaining of a ‘contract organisation’ like the WTO. In brief, the ITO which was 
ntended to be the ‘fair trade’ coping stone of the Br tton Woods system represented 
by institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, was never established because 
Truman’s awareness of deep-seated congressional opposition to domestic and 
international financial regulation dissuaded him from seeking its ratification in 
November 1950. It is significant that the only part of the ITO which saw the light of 
day was its provisions for lowering tariffs and eliminating restrictions which took 
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shape as GATT, because they were modelled on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of the United States and could therefore be adopted by executive action without 
recourse to Congress. Europe and the world still await, hopefully not in vain, the 
collective financial regulation which is so clearly needed to obviate inordinate 
financial and economic instability and preserve peace. 
